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Abstract
The most important development of 2000 in competition law for Intellectual Property (“IP”)
advisors is, probably, the judgment in the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) in Bayer v. Commission.
Preventing traders buying medicines in countries where the government permits them to be sold
only at prices well below world levels has long created problems. Parallel traders then sell them
in countries where the maximum price is higher.
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I. DISCOURAGING PARALLEL TRADE
The most important development of 2000 in competition
law for Intellectual Property ("IP") advisors is, probably, the
judgment in the Court of First Instance ("CFI") in Bayer v. Com-
mission.1 Preventing traders buying medicines in countries
where the government permits them to be sold only at prices
well below world levels has long created problems. Parallel trad-
ers then sell them in countries where the maximum price is
higher.
A. Exhaustion
Once the product has been sold in one Member State by or
with the consent of the holder of an IP right in another, the
latter cannot exercise that right to restrain commercial import of
the protected product. The right is said to be exhausted by the
first sale. 2 The doctrine of exhaustion applies generally and not
* Visiting Professor at Fordham Law School, Professor Emeritus of Competition
Law at University College London, visiting Professor at College of Europe and author of
many books and articles.
This is a revised part of a paper given in 2001 at a conference organized by Profes-
sor Hugh Hansen at Fordham Law School. The whole of the Essay will be published by
Juris Publications as (2002) 5 International, Intellectual Property Law and Policy. Elea-
nor Fox commented on this part of the Essay and her comment follows this Essay.
1. Bayer v. Commission, Case T-41/96, (2001] 4 C.M.L.R. 4 (Oct. 26, 2000). The
Commission has appealed, (C-2 & 3/01P) O.J. 2001 C79/14. Judges Cooke, President
Garcia-Valdecasas, Lindh, Pirrung, and Vilaris did not sit in Micro Leader Business, below.
Id.
2. This was clearly held in relation to patents in Centrafarm BV & Adriaan de Peijper
v. Sterling Drug Inc., Case 15/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1147, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480, C.M.R.
8246, and for trademarks in the companion case, Centrafarm BV & Adriaan de Peijper v.
Winthrop BX, Case 16/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480, C.M.R. 8247. The
doctrine was extended to situations where there was no intellectual property right in
the country of export to be exhausted. See Merck & Co. Inc. v. Stephar BV, Case 187/
80, [1981] E.C.R. 2063, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 463, C.M.R. 8707; see also Merck & Co Inc. v.
972
'CONSENT'
only to medicines. The problem, however, is most acute in that
sector because, directly or indirectly, all the governments of
Member States control the price of medicines at levels that
vary-some by limiting the price that may legally be charged,
others by negotiating with the IP holders to reduce their prices if
they want the cost of the medicines to be paid or reimbursed by
a national health service, etc.
Moreover, medicines are a product for which price discrimi-
nation is especially rewarding without harming anyone. More
investment in research and development ("R&D") is financed by
the private sector than for almost any other product.' The varia-
ble cost of production and sale is a small part of total costs, in-
cluding R&D and the safety trials required by law. If it is illegal
to charge much in some countries, it may continue to be worth
selling there if production and sales costs are covered and there
is even a small contribution to the overhead-"Ramsey pricing."
The discrimination makes everyone better off: consumers in the
low price countries are able to buy the product and they make
some contribution to the overhead for the benefit also of those
in the high cost countries.
B. Article 81
Not only has the doctrine of exhaustion prevented the use
of IP rights to restrain parallel trade within the Community, the
Directorate General ("DG") for Competition has been hostile to
export bans in distribution agreements.4 Article 81(1) of the
Primecrown Limited, Joined Cases C-267/95 & 268/95, [1996] E.C.R. 1-6285, [1997] 1
C.M.L.R. 83, [1997] 1 C.E.C. (CCH) 261. It has also been extended to copyright,
Warner Bros. & Metronome v. Christiansen, Case 158/86, [1988] E.C.R. 2605, C.M.R.
14497, except for performing rights, SA Compagnie Gn6rale pour la Diffusion de la Telvi-
sion) v. Cin6-Vog Films, Case 62/79, [1980] E.C.R. 881, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 362, C.M.R.
8662.
3. See Derek Ridyard & David Lewis, Parallel Trade in Patented Medicines: I Economics
in Defence of Market Segmentation, [1998] INT'L TRADE L. REv. 12. Defense expenditure is
usually made under contract and reimbursed by the government, and this covers part of
the cost of developing new airplanes and engines.
4. The group exemption for distribution agreements exempts restraints on active
sales to protect one distributor or supplier from another distributor, but not to protect
a technology licensee. Commission Regulation No. 2790/1999, O.J. L 336/21, art.
4(b), first indent (1994). Protection from active sales does not protect one distributor
from another who sells through a website even in the language of the former.
Commission Regulation No. 240/96, Technology transfer, O.J. L 31/2 (1996);
[1996] 4 C.M.L.R. 405, exempting technology transfer agreements, permits restraints
on parallel trade between the territory of licensor and licensees or between licensees
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Treaty Establishing the European Community5 ("EC") prohibits
as incompatible with the Common Market agreements between
undertakings, decisions of associations of undertakings and con-
certed practices that may affect trade between member States
and have the object or effect of restricting competition within
the common market.
The Community concern for the interest of parallel traders
and the short term interests of consumers has been cogently
criticised in many articles, notably by some given in the series of
conferences held at Fordham Law School.6 It is not my topic
today.
C. Bayer v. Commission
I want to speak about the way that Bayer tackled its problem
of parallel imports. Its best selling range of medicines was sold
under the names Adelat or Adelate. The maximum prices le-
inter se. Moreover, the Commission considers that the doctrine of exhaustion does not
prevent the exercise of intellectual property fights to restrain a licensee from exporting
to another Member State. The doctrine of exhaustion does, however, prevent the use
of intellectual property rights to prevent the export of products lawfully sold by the
licensee elsewhere. This permits little protection for products that pass through deal-
ers.
5. Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ. C 340/3 (1997) [hereinafter
EC Treaty], incorporating changes made 6y Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on
European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain re-
lated acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997).
6. Charles Baden Fuller, Economic Issues Relating to Property Rights in Trademarks: Ex-
port Bans, Differential Pricing, Restrictions on Resale and Repackaging, 6 EUR. L. REv. 162
(1981); LAURENCE W. GORMLEY, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS OF TRADE WITHIN THE E.E.C.:
THE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS OF ARTICLES 30-36 OF THE E.E.C. TREATY (1985); INTER-
NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1996); Ren6
Joliet, Patented Articles and the Free Movement of Goods Within the E.E.C., 28 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 15 (1975); Ren6 Joliet, Trademark Licensing Agreements Under the E.E.C. Law of
Competition, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 755 (1984); Rend Joliet, Territorial and Exclusive
Trademark Licensing Under the E.E.C. Law of Competition, 15 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 21 (1984); Valentine Korah, Dividing the Common Market Through National
Industrial Property Rights, 35 MOD. L. REv. 634 (1972); Valentine Korah, National Patents
and the Free Movement of Goods, 38 MOD. L. REV. 333 (1975); Ridyard & Lewis, supra note
3; Andreas Reindl, Emerging Conflict of Laws Issues on the Global Information Structure, 5
INTERNATIONAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & POLICY (2001); WARWICK A. ROTHNIE,
PARALLEL TRADE (1993); Warwick A. Rothnie, Hag lI: Putting the Common Origin Doctrine
to Sleep, 13 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 24 (1991); Nicholas Shae, Parallel Importers' Use of
Trade Marks: The Liabilities, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 103 (1997); Concepi6n Fernfn-
dez Vicifn, Why Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products Should be Forbidden, 17 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REv. 219 (1996); Michel Waelbroeck, The Effect of the Rome Treaty on the
Exercise of National Industrial Property Rights, 21 ANTITRUST BULL 99 (1976).
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gally obtainable in Spain and France were some forty percent
lower than those obtainable in the UK. From 1989, French
wholesalers started to undermine the UK price by exporting
there and, from 1991, the Spanish wholesalers did the same. Be-
tween 1989 and 1993 Bayer sales to its UK subsidiary fell by
about half.
Bayer was careful not to forbid or even discourage its
French or Spanish dealers from parallel trade. It reduced the
amount of Adelat available to them to what it thought they
needed for domestic sales, normally what they had received in
an earlier period plus ten percent. Each dealer was informed of
its maximum amount. These dealers continued to do everything
they could to obtain more Adelat and exported all they could to
the UK.
To infringe Article 81 of the EC Treaty, there must be some
collusion between firms independent of each other, but collu-
sion is found in Europe far more easily than in the United
States.7 In Bayer, the Commission found that there was an agree-
ment between Bayer France and Bayer Spain on the one hand,
and the French and Spanish dealers, imposing an export ban
and fined Bayer 3 million ECU.8
Bayer appealed on the ground that its conduct was unilat-
eral and involved no collusion with the dealers. Concertation
within the Bayer group is irrelevant, as parent and dependent
subsidiary are treated as a single undertaking.9 Consequently,
there is no collusion between undertakings. The question was
whether collusion between Bayer and any individual French or
Spanish wholesaler had taken place.
The CFI considered the earlier case law on the concept of
"agreement" from paragraph 66 and concluded that it:
69. [ ... ] centres around the existence of a concurrence of
wills between at least two parties, the form in which it is
manifested being unimportant so long as it constitutes
the faithful expression of the parties' intention.
70. In certain circumstances, measures adopted or imposed
in an apparently unilateral manner by a manufacturer in
the context of his continuing relations with his distribu-
7. EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 81, OJ. C 340/3, at 70 (1997) (ex Article 85).
8. Commission Decision No. 96/478/EEC, O.J. L 201/1 (1996), [1996] C.E.C.
(CCH) 2421.
9. Viho v. Commission, Case 73/95P, [1996] E.C.R. 1-5457, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. 419.
9752002]
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tors have been regarded as constituting an agreement
within the meaning of Article 85 (1) [now Article 81 (1) ]
of the Treaty (Joined Cases 32 & 36-82/78 BMWBelgium
SA v. Commission;'° AEG;" Ford and Ford Europe;12 Case
75/84, Metro v. E.C. Commission ("Metro II");13 Case 277/
87, Sandoz; 4 Case C-70/93, BMWv. Ald15).
71. That case law shows that a distinction should be drawn
between cases in which an undertaking has adopted a
genuinely unilateral measure, and thus without the ex-
press or implied participation of another undertaking,
and those in which the unilateral character of the mea-
sure is merely apparent. Whilst the former do not fall
within Article 85(1) of the Treaty, the latter must be re-
garded as revealing an agreement between undertakings
and may therefore fall within the scope of that article.
That is the case, in particular, with practices and mea-
sures in restraint of competition which, though appar-
ently adopted unilaterally by the manufacturer in the
context of its contractual relations with its dealers, never-
theless receive at least the tacit acquiescence of those
dealers.
72. It is also clear from that case-law that the Commission
cannot hold that apparently unilateral conduct on the
part of a manufacturer adopted in the context of the con-
tractual relations which he maintains with his dealers, in
reality forms the basis of an agreement between under-
takings within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty
if it does not establish the existence of an acquiescence by
the other partners express or implied, in the attitude
adopted by the manufacturer. (BMW Belgium; 6 AEG;17
Ford and Ford Europe;'8 Metro II;' 9 Sandoz;20 BMW v.
Ald21 ) .22
Bayer admitted that it had "introduced a unilateral policy
10. [1979] E.C.R. 2435; [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 370, 91 28-30.
11. [1983] E.C.R. 3151; [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 325, 38.
12. [1985] E.C.R. 2725; [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 528, 21.
13. [1986] E.C.R. 3021; [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 118, 9 72-73.
14. [1990] E.C.R. 1-45; [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 242, 1 7-12.
15. [1995] E.C.R. 1-3439; [1996] 4 C.M.L.R. 478, 16-17.
16. [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 370, 9 28-30.
17. [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 325, 1 38.
18. [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 528, 1 21.
19. [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 118, 72-73.
20. [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 242, 7-12.
21. [1996] 4 C.M.L.R. 478, 91 16-17.
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designed to reduce parallel imports," but denied having planned
and imposed an export ban or having had discussions with deal-
ers about an export ban, let alone making an agreement with
them.23 Moreover, Bayer had stated that the dealers did not ad-
here in any way to its unilateral policy and had no wish to do so.
The Court went very carefully through the evidence in rela-
tion to each of Bayer's dealers. It analyzed the evidence pro-
vided by the Commission in its decision and asked sharp ques-
tions at the hearing.24
It found that although Bayer intended to restrain parallel
trade it did not intend to impose an export ban on the French
or Spanish dealers. Bayer tried to work out how much Adelat
each dealer needed for its domestic customers, but did not
check how much was actually exported by each to the UK.25
The CFI also found that the dealers did not agree, even tac-
itly, not to export. They tried to obtain all the Adelat they could
by putting in many small orders as well as the large ones they
had been submitting centrally and provided all the Adelat not
needed domestically for export. At paragraph 136, the Court
stated "the wholesalers are required to ensure the distribution of
products on the national market in an appropriate and stable
manner." It did not, however, treat this as discouraging the deal-
ers from exporting so much Adelat that insufficient would re-
main for local consumption.
Finally, the CFI distinguished the facts of the current case
from the case law cited by the Commission.26 Unlike Sandoz,27
the invoices sent after each order accepted did not state "export
prohibited." In Tipp-Ex v. Commission, the European Court of
Justice ("ECJ") found that the dealer had cooperated with the
supplier's request to raise the price of exports so as to remove
any incentive for the purchaser to buy in another Member
State. 2 ' The CFI distinguished BMW, AEG and Ford on the
22. Bayer AG v. Commission, Case T-41/96, [2001] 4 C.M.L.R. 4, 11 69-72 (Oct.
26, 2000).
23. Id. 76.
24. The parties are warned of these questions in advance, so as to have a real
chance to answer them.
25. Bayer, [2001] 4 C.M.L.R. 4, 81-89, 100.
26. Id. 158-71.
27. [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 242.
28. [1990] E.C.R. 1-261.
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ground that it is not enough to find a context of a contractual
relationship-cooperation by the dealers must be established.
Nor is it sufficient for the Commission to find that the dealers
did not break off contractual relationships. 29
Doubtless, pharmaceutical and other companies disturbed
by parallel trade will try to follow Bayer's plan, but they will have
to be very careful. The marketing department must never try to
persuade their customers not to export. Monitoring the final
destination by including codes or otherwise is dangerous.
Where a duty to supply the local market is imposed, it may be
difficult to avoid discouraging exports of more of the product
than will enable sufficient to remain for local sale.
Nevertheless, it is now clear that there is a narrow path on
which a non-dominant firm may charge different prices in differ-
ent Member States and reduce parallel trade, although the Com-
mission has lodged an appeal. Its continued refusal to condone
export bans and contractual provisions of similar effect, even in
the pharmaceutical sector where fixed costs are high and varia-
ble costs are low, is demonstrated by the Commission's decision
in Glaxo/Welcome.3 ° The Commission ordered a pharmaceutical
company to stop infringing Article 81 by dual pricing-charging
more for the medicines not ultimately sold in Spain. The price
of the drugs paid for by the Spanish national health system was
controlled by Spanish law at a lower level.
Glaxo/Welcome argued that discouraging Spanish whole-
salers from selling in the UK would result in its devoting more
funds to R&D." The Commission did not address the argument
that economists advocate Ramsey pricing, recovering more of
the overhead costs from those more able to pay than from
others, provided that the variable costs of every sale are recov-
ered.32
The argument was raised only by implication at paragraph
93. The justification of dual pricing seems to have been argued
on the basis of a contribution only to R&D and not on a contri-
29. Bayer, [2001] 4 C.M.L.R. 4, 172-73.
30. O.J. 2001, L 302/1 (Nov. 17, 2001).
31. It seems that these costs were not included as "development." Id. 9 157-88.
32. The Commission stated that the percentage of turnover invested by Glaxo/
Welcome in R&D was between 13 and 14 % (id. 95) rising to 15 % (id. 157), but it
did not give the percentage of costs sunk in marketing or in obtaining approval for the
sale of its medicines.
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bution to other overhead costs. By finding that any attempt to
minimize the distortion by the Spanish control of prices to com-
petition infringed Article 81(1) and required exemption, the
Commission imposed the onus on the parties.
D. Copyright May Trump Article 81 when There is No Exhaustion
In Micro Leader Business33 the CFI confirmed the Commis-
sion's rejection of a complaint by a parallel trader under Article
81 on the ground that there was no collusion between indepen-
dent firms. Judgments based on the rejection of a complaint are
seldom as clear as those on substance. The Commission is enti-
tled to choose its priorities as long as it gives cogent reasons for
rejecting a complaint. Consequently, much turns on the phras-
ing of the letter dismissing the complaint.
Microsoft sold some French language software in Canada.
Microsoft France sent an information bulletin to its dealers in-
forming them that measures had been taken to reinforce the
ban on marketing Canadian products outside Canada.
On the ground that the measures concerned were the law-
ful exercise of Microsoft's copyright in the software, the Commis-
sion rejected a complaint from a parallel importer based on Arti-
cle 81. The software had not been sold by the holder or with its
consent in the Common Market and there is no doctrine of in-
ternational exhaustion.34 The Bulletin issued by Microsoft's sub-
sidiary was a unilateral act and there was no evidence that it was
issued in collusion with its dealers in Canada or France. Any
collusion between dependent companies within the Microsoft
group falls outside Article 81(1). This the CFI accepted at
paragraphs 30 to 40.
30. It is, therefore, apparent from the contested Decision,
first, that the Commission takes the view that the appli-
cant has not put forward any evidence in its complaint
that Microsoft's measures to prevent the importation into
France of French-language products marketed in Canada
were taken under an agreement with Canadian and/or
French dealers. The Commission essentially takes the
view that such measures must in fact be considered to be
33. Micro Leader Business v. Commission, Case T-198/98, [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 886.
34. Silhouette Internationale Schmied GmbH & Co. KC v. Hartlauer Handellshaft
mbh, Case C-355/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4799, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953, [1998] C.E.C. 676
(July 16, 1998).
2002]
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unilateral inasmuch as they constitute the enforcement
by MC of the copyright it holds over its products mar-
keted in Canada under Article 4(c) of Directive 91/250.
Nor, secondly, has it furnished evidence that there was an
agreement to fix resale prices on the French market.
31. An infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty necessarily
results from collaboration by several undertakings. The
Commission cannot, therefore, be accused of having
committed an error of law or a manifest error of assess-
ment in taking the view that, in the absence of proof of
the existence of an agreement or a concerted practice be-
tween two or more undertakings. The actions of the
Microsoft group impugned in the applicant's complaint
did not constitute an infringement of Article 85(1) of the
Treaty.
34. Furthermore .... even if MC did in fact restrict in that
way the opportunities for Canadian distributors to sell
their products outside Canada, MC would merely have
been enforcing the copyright it holds over its products
under Community law.
3 5
The Appellant had also complained that forbidding import
of the French language product from Canada amounted to the
abuse of a dominant position. This was rejected by the Com-
mission on the ground that the complainant had furnished little
proof that Microsoft was dominant. It had not identified the rel-
evant product market. So, the Commission might not be able to
establish a dominant position.
It would not decide the question since the conduct did not
appear abusive even if it could be established that Microsoft was
dominant. It had restrained import of products that had not
been marketed in the Common Market with consent of the
holder. Moreover, there was no evidence that it had charged the
appellant more than other firms within the Common Market.
The CFI decided, however, that:
54. Whilst it is true that, under Article 4(c) of Directive 91/
250, the marketing by MC of copies of software in Canada
does not, in itself, exhaust MC's copyright over its products in
the Community ... the factual evidence put forward by the
35. Micro Leader Business, [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 886, 1 30-31, 34. (footnotes omitted).
36. Id. 1 49.
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applicant constitutes, at the very least, an indication that, for
equivalent transactions, Microsoft applied lower prices on the
Canadian market than on the Community market and that
the Community prices were excessive.
55. The extract from MF's information bulletin ... suggests
that the products imported from Canada were in direct com-
petition with the products marketed in France and that their
resale price in France was significantly lower, despite the ex-
pense of importing them into the Community from a third
country. The information contained in that bulletin cannot
be considered to be of no relevance whatsoever since it comes
from an undertaking, MF, which belongs to the group hold-
ing the copyright over the products at issue.
The Court referred to the judgments of the ECJ in Silhouette
International Schmied37 and Sebago and Maison Dubois38 to establish
that there is no international doctrine of exhaustion.
Charging higher prices in the Community than in Canada,
however, would infringe Article 86. The Commission could not
maintain at the time of its rejection that there was no evidence
of an abuse without going further into the complaint. The CFI,
therefore, quashed the decision under Article 86 for a manifest
error of appreciation.
The ability of a copyright holder that enjoys a dominant po-
sition in the common market to exercise its intellectual property
rights ("IPRs") to keep goods out of the Common Market may
not be of much use to dominant firms, if it is treated as discrimi-
natory and illegal to discriminate in price as between dealers in-
side and outside the Common Market. Non-dominant firms,
which are allowed to discriminate, however, may find the unilat-
eral action route promising.
All too often the ECJ and CFI have treated discrimination as
abusive without considering any economic justification. Discrim-
ination is one of the examples of the abuse of a dominant posi-
tion set out in Article 82 of the EC Treaty. Sometimes the Com-
mission has not objected on the grounds that the markets are
different, but it has not accepted that discrimination is justified
when variable cost is a small part of total cost. 9
37. Case 355/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4799; [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953; [1998] C.E.C. 676.
38. Case 173/98, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4103, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 1317.
39. See Ridyard & Lewis, supra note 3.
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